

ORDER
FROM THE CHAIR OF THE COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY [KGB] OF THE USSR

30th of August 1986
Moscow

On measures to strengthen the counter-intelligence work at nuclear power plants in connection with the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station

The accident that occurred on April 26, 1986 at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was one of the most serious in the history of nuclear energy generation. It has led to the loss of human lives, the discharge of significant quantities of radioactive materials into the environment, brought serious moral, material, and political damage to the State, and raised significant concerns among all Soviet people and the global community.

The accident and its consequences are being used in bourgeois propaganda and by the enemy's secret services to develop an anti-Soviet campaign, to discredit our atomic energy industry, and to destroy the prestige of the socialist economy and science. By speculating on what has occurred the enemy is creating additional difficulties in the USSR's trade with Western partners and also making attempts to introduce elements of distrust into the cooperation between socialist countries.

The special services of the USA and its NATO allies are making audacious attempts through the agents acting under the cover of embassies of capitalist countries in Moscow, representatives of foreign companies, journalists, and other foreign citizens. The technological means of surveillance are also being used to obtain secret information about the radiation conditions within the zone of the nuclear power station and beyond its boundaries, the level of effects on the population, the military preparedness of Chemical Defence troops and of the Civil Defence, main activities to eliminate the consequences of the accident, and so on. Hostile elements within the Soviet population are also becoming more active in their attempts to collect and provide negative information to foreigners.

The conclusions of the Government Commission have demonstrated that the accident became possible first and foremost as a consequence of the irresponsible and negligent ways in which the leadership of the Chernobyl station and a number of managers in the Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Medium Machine Building, and State Atomic Energy Inspectorate of the USSR addressed the questions of nuclear safety. There were also lenient expectations from the leadership in the following of the strictest discipline in the use of nuclear reactors, the lagging of scientific research on a number of technical problems, inadequacies in the design of RBMK type reactors, and an unsatisfactory implementation of resolutions made by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, to ensure that nuclear power stations operate in a highly reliable way.

Workers of the subdivisions of the KGB's central apparatus, Ukraine, Belarus, the city of Kiev and Kiev Region are actively taking part in the investigation of the causes of the accident and in the activities to limit its consequences. A version of a possible sabotage by the enemy or hostile elements was thoroughly investigated in a short period of time. Cooperation in the

investigation of criminal cases related to the accident was provided to the offices of the Prosecutor. The important information to increase the effectiveness of work in the Chernobyl zone was provided in the form of a report to the authorities and appropriate Ministries; the conditions that may lead to negative positions among certain categories of citizens are being eliminated.

The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant has clearly demonstrated that the State Security support at nuclear power plants is still not meeting the requirements of the Resolution passed by the USSR KGB on July 11, 1984: "On the status of counter-intelligence work in the area of atomic energy and measures for its further improvement". The accident has revealed the inadequacies of the system of operational measures and, most importantly, in the prevention of critical events at nuclear power stations and uncovering and removing the conditions and causes of accidents.

The Pripyat City Department of the Ukrainian KGB Administration did not pay the necessary attention in the process of its counterintelligence work to various experiments that involved significant risks and to tests at the active energy unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, as well as to the cases of negligence and violations of construction standards, radiation safety requirements and technical regulations for the use of equipment. The quality of the intelligence staff and its placement did not allow for the accurate evaluation of the impact of the experiments that were carried out on the vulnerability of the station and on the reliability and safety of its use.

Despite receiving information from the territorial offices of the Republic about conditions that could lead to dangerous incidents at nuclear power plants, the Committee of State Security of Ukraine did not react properly and did not always inform the USSR KGB, the Party, or relevant State agencies.

The Sixth Administration of the USSR KGB did not exercise sufficient control over the activities of territorial agency subdivisions to carry out the USSR KGB's Resolution from July 11, 1984. The continuity of the counterintelligence process at the nuclear power station was not always sufficiently reinforced by the required organisational measures, from the stage of design and siting of the nuclear power plant, to the commencement of its operation.

Employees of the subdivisions of the central apparatus and the local subdivisions of the KGB were basing their decisions on the statements of leading scientists and specialists about the absolute reliability of the RBMK type of reactors and, therefore, did not fully understand the information received in regards to a potential danger in their design. This had a direct effect on the organisation of counterintelligence efforts at nuclear power plants to prevent the emergency situations.

The managing operational staff of the KGB at the nuclear power plants were taking insufficient measures for the prompt revealing and elimination of the conditions leading to accidents, caused by violations of the technological process at nuclear power plants and by criminal negligence in the work of officials and service personnel of the station. The Recommendations of the Sixth Administration of the USSR KGB on the improvement of

counterintelligence at the nuclear power stations were prepared and provided to the territorial offices, but were not used by them appropriately.

The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is a serious warning and lesson for the KGB. Its consequences require that additional measures must be taken in the interests of State safety to increase the role of the KGB in the existing system of ensuring the safe operation of nuclear power plants.

I ORDER THE FOLLOWING:

1. To the leadership of the Committee of State Security [KGB] of the Ukraine (Comrades S.N. Mukha and Y.V. Petrov) and the KGB Administration for Kiev and Kiev Region (L.V. Bykhov):

Draw the necessary conclusions from the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and conduct the analysis and re-evaluation of the status of counterintelligence work at nuclear power plants, in order to bring it into strict conformity with the requirements of the Resolution of the USSR KGB from July 11th, 1984. Take active measures and increase personal responsibility for informing the USSR KGB and Party, Soviet, and other authorities about important questions relating to the safety of nuclear power plants in a timely manner.

Ensure a sense of elevated responsibility in the operational staff in relation to their assigned cases, a deep understanding of those cases, and of the fact that intelligence work in this division requires the special approach and a new level of operational thinking. The staff should be oriented towards the creation of the reliable protection system for nuclear power plants, ensuring the prevention of sabotage efforts by the enemy and hostile elements and the avoidance of emergency situations, including those arising as a result of violations of established rules and standards in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants.

2. To the chairpersons of the KGB of the Soviet and autonomous republics, to the leaders of the Ukrainian KGB Administration for cities and regions, and to military counterintelligence, providing support to operational nuclear power plants, as well as to those in the construction and design stages, to scientific research and construction organisations, factories for the production of equipment and fuel for nuclear power plants, its re-processing and utilisation:

Take effective measures to promptly uncover the conditions that may cause accidents or emergency situations at nuclear power plants. For these purposes:

- Strengthen covert work, recruiting highly qualified specialists and scientists who are capable of not only promptly uncovering and competently evaluating violations and insufficiencies at nuclear power plants, but also of providing justifiable proposals to eliminate them and prevent their re-occurrence as emergency situations;

- Devote particular attention to uncover individuals, whose actions create conditions that may cause accidents, promptly reveal the causes and motives of their behaviour and possible connection of these individuals with the enemy's special services;
 - Ensure close cooperation with the administration and oversight authorities. Use State Security positions more actively in control and inspection services, in order to obtain operationally significant information about the condition of the equipment, the conduction of scientific experiments, the quality of construction, repair or commissioning work at active nuclear power plants and at those under construction. Evaluate signals from all sources about possible consequences of violations of technological processes, operational rules, security regimes and norms of radiation safety;
 - Promptly uncover failures connected with the use, storage, transportation and the treatment of the radioactive waste. Uncover and assess individuals connected with the theft of radioactive isotopes, establish the purposes and motives of their activities, and take active measures to prevent the use of radioactive substances and isotopes for hostile purposes;
 - Improve cooperation between agencies and military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Chemical Defence, subdivisions of the Civil Defence and medical services. Form a reliable intelligence presence in these organisations and continuously control and assess their preparedness for action in emergency situations;
 - Swiftly inform Party, Soviet and other administrative agencies related to nuclear power plants about all inadequacies uncovered by covert means, which may lead to emergency situations, to ensure their complete elimination. Fully support the collective formation of intolerance towards any cases of carelessness, complacency, or other deviations that may have a negative impact on the safety system at nuclear power plants;
 - Officers of the USSR KGB active reserve and deputy directors for security at nuclear power plants, and in places where they do not exist, the heads of city and/or district agencies of the KGB and KGB Administration are to report all instances of actual conditions that may lead to emergency situations, where they require an immediate intervention by the appropriate Ministries and agencies, to the Sixth Administration of the USSR KGB, without delay.
3. To the Sixth Administration and the USSR KGB Investigative Department, along with other subdivisions:

Provide active assistance to the offices of the Prosecutor in the investigation of criminal cases in relation to actual perpetrators of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Prepare an overview of covert operative and investigative activities and their results, with the participation of the Higher School of the USSR KGB, as well as the recommendations on investigation methods of emergency situations at nuclear power plants.

4. To the Ukrainian KGB, the Belarus KGB, the KGB Administration for Bryansk and other regions, which are leading work in districts subjected to radioactive contamination, and to the special departments of the USSR KGB that are providing military units for the elimination of the consequences of the accident:

Promptly react to the information received about the activities of foreigners and their connections among Soviet citizens to collect information about the scale and consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Swiftly uncover any conditions that may result in the development of negative events, and take measures to prevent them. Use full State Security capability to ensure the cooperation in the existing State efforts to eliminate the consequences of the accident, ensure a clear control of the operational conditions in the accident zone and in the districts surrounding it.

5. To the Sixth Administration of the USSR KGB, the KGB of Lithuania, the KGB Administration for Kiev and the Kiev region, Leningrad, Kursk, and Smolensk regions:

Introduce appropriate corrective measures in the counterintelligence plans at nuclear power plants, considering the failures uncovered in the design of RBMK type reactors and planned measures to redesign/reconstruct them.

6. To the First Main Administration:

Activate the work of personnel posted abroad to uncover the plans and intentions of the enemy's secret services in relation to the nuclear energy in the USSR, and to obtain scientific and technical information on questions related to the safe use of nuclear energy. In cooperation with security agencies of friendly countries and with the Sixth Administration of the USSR KGB, strengthen the work to prevent emergency situations at nuclear power plants that are being constructed with the support of USSR in socialist countries. Persistently oppose the attempts of the enemy's special services to discredit the development of Soviet nuclear energy and cooperation in this area between the USSR and other countries.

7. Establish that the 6th subdivision and city/district agencies of the KGB and KGB Administration is to carry out counterintelligence work in the military units of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs that ensure the safety and security of nuclear power plants.

8. The Human Resources Administration of USSR KGB, together with the Sixth Administration:

Develop measures directed at the retaining of the staff carrying out the counterintelligence work at nuclear power plants at the KGB city/district divisions, and increase their professional and technical level, within three months.

9. The Sixth Administration of the USSR KGB:

- Strengthen the oversight and provision of practical assistance to the territorial KGB agencies that are ensuring state security at nuclear power plants;

- Develop the Regulation on Deputy Directors of Nuclear Power Plant for Security, in conjunction with the Ministry of Atomic Energy and present it to the USSR KGB, within three months;
 - Organise and hold a conference in December 1986, together with other interested subdivisions of the central KGB apparatus, involving leading staff of relevant KGB divisions and Deputy Directors for Security, which are undertaking the counterintelligence work at nuclear power plants, industrial and scientific research installations.
10. The Directive Number 390 of the KGB of the USSR from June 14th, 1986 is no longer valid.

Committee Chair V. Chebrikov